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Several recent studies have isolated integration skills -
that is, the ability to co-ordinate separate pieces of infor-
mation into a cohesive unit - as being important to semantic
memory functioning. This study was designed to investigate
whether very young children, and 'ih years of age, possess
the ability to integrate various pieces of verbal information
and to see if it has any effect on memory for that information.
In Experiment I, children were presented with a search
task which was divided into two phases. In the acquisition
portion, children learned to find toy containers hidden in
particular locations to a criterion of three successive
correct responses. Following acquisition, children were
given information concerning the relationship between toy
objects and the containers, and were asked to locate the
hidden objects. In this task, where successful performance
required subjects to co-ordinate object-container relations
with previously learned container-location relations to .
derive the location of the object, it was found that both
and V'i year olds responded correctly at levels which were
dramatically above chance. Furthermore, V-i year olds made
more correct integration responses than 2H year olds. How-
2ever, the results of a test for initial container-location
relations following a failure to locate an object indicated
that the poorer performance of 2^^ year olds could be attri-
buted to their higher rate of forgetting of initial container-
location relationships.
Experiment II tested the hypothesis that having to
perform an integrative operation on verbal material might
facilitate memory for that material. A task similar to the
one described above was used with the exception that on half
the trials information about the location of the object was
given to subjects directly, while on the other half, locating
the objects required an integration of information. Also,
a delay of 30 seconds was introduced on half the trials
prior to allowing the subjects to search for the designated
objects; on the other half of the trials children were permitted
to search for objects immediately. In general, performance
between direct and integration trials did not differ in either
delay or immediate conditions for either age group. Although
these findings do not provide strong support for the hypothesis
being tested, it was felt that the introduction of an integra-
tion pre-test on delayed integration trials to insure that
integration did in fact occur might yield clear results.
Both experiments demonstrated clearly that integration
is a skill which even very young children possess, and that
when they fail to integrate it is usually because they have
forgotten initial information. The present findings were
3contrasted to earlier studies which found that integration
was not in the cognitive repertoire of younger children. The
discrepancy in the findings was discussed in terms of differ-
ences in the meaningfulness of the materials used and varia-
tions in task demands.
4Integration and Memory in Very Young Children
Introduction
Researchers concerned with the development of memory
are taking an increasingly holistic orientation in their
investigations, regarding memory as an integral and insepa-
rable part of cognitive functioning in general, rather than
as a phenomenon to be studied in isolation. More and more,
levels of cognitive development, with their corresponding
qualitative and quantitative characteristics, are being
recognized as having great significance in the way in which
memory processes develop. Certainly, this view of memory as
an integral part of cognition is not a new one. Bartlett
(19J2), for example, in his treatment of memory, warned tha t
it was impossible to study any higher level process in iso-
lation from other mental processes. Piaget's theory of
intellectual growth has also consistently retained the flavor
of regarding changes in cognitive stages as influencing all
aspects of knowing, of which memory is but one. This approach
has been revitalized more recently, however, by a growing
number of cognitive psychologists, including those interested
in developmental change (Brown, 1975a; Cofer, 1973; Flavell,
1971; Jenkins, 197J; Meacham, 1972; Paris, 1975; Piaget and
Inhelder, 197i).
Perhaps the most influential force in the trend toward
a holistic, organismic psychology of memory development has
been the work of Piaget and his colleagues. In their most
5recent treatment of this subject, Piaget and Inhelder (197i)
have explicitly applied the general principles of Piaget 's
theory of intellectual development to the specific case of
memory. As in other aspects of knowing activity, changes in
memory processes are seen as being reflective of changes in
cognitive structures and modes of operative thinking at
various developmental stages. A child who is functioning at
a particular stage (e.g., pre-operational ) will incorporate
information into his existing schemes, and memory for that
information will also necessarily be a function of those
schemes. Thus, a child who does not have the logico-mathe-
matical structures for ordering objects in serial order will
not be able to reconstruct a seriated array of sticks after
a delay period. Memory for the display improves, however,
as the child acquires the appropriate logical structures.
Similarly, memory for other causal or spatial relationships
changes as the corresponding logical schemes for these rela-
tionships become organized. Central to this theory, also,
is the conceptualization of the child as an active partici-
pant in the building of his knowledge (and memory) store.
Through the processes of assimilation and accommodation
reorganization of cognitive schemes, which in turn interact
with memory, constantly takes place. In contrast to more
mechanistic, passive theories, where memory development is
regarded as the gradual accumulation of associations or bits
of information, Piagetian theory emphasizes the dynamic
6interplay between the child and external events. The child,
in essence, operates on incoming information employing the
cognitive schemes he possesses at a particular stage of
development, and memory is a function of those operations.
Like Piaget, Soviet developmental psychologists (Smirnov
and Zinchenko, 1969; Yendovitskaya, 1971) also believe that
memory is a consequence of the activity of the individual,
and understanding the nature of these activities is essential
to the understanding of memory per se. Specifically, they
maintain that material which is a central part of the
activity of the subject will be remembered, while that which
is peripheral to the activity will not be.
Even though the validity of some of the experimental
findings upon which Piaget 's theory is based has been
questioned (see Liben, 1976, for example), there is no
doubt that this dynamic and organismic view of memory
espoused by both Piaget and the Soviets has influenced much
of the research which is currently being conducted. The
topic of the present study derives from this orientation,
as well. The general themes of the importance of cognitive
skills at a particular developmental level and the active
interaction between subject and object provide the impetus
to the research on integration and memory which follows.
The major question being considered here is whether very
young children possess a particular cognitive skill — the
ability to integrate verbal information, to co-ordinate two
7pieces of information in order to reach a conclusion.
Because there is much ambiguity in the literature surrounding
the use of the term "integration" (or alternatively, "infer-
ence"), the precise nature of the skill to be examined here
is important to establish. "Integration" and "inference"
have been used to describe a multitude of behaviors, ranging
from the simple co-ordination of two pieces of information
to the process involved in propositional logic. No attempt
to distinguish or systematically categorize various types of
"inference-making" will be made in the present discussion,
(although this is clearly an issue which need to be con-
sidered at greater length). For the purposes of this paper,
only the term "integration" will be used to describe the
cognitive skill being examined, and it will atheoretically
simply refer to the ability of the child to combine two
separate pieces of information with which he is presented
in order to derive a conclusion.
A related question being examined in this study is
whether the occurrence of integration has significant con-
sequences for memory. Since the formulation of both problems
addressed here was derived from experimental findings per-
taining to semantic memory processing in children and the
cognitive skills which affect this processing, the review
of the literature which follows will develop the importance
of integration skills in the context of semantic memory
processing in children. First, some general aspects of
semantic memory in children will be discussed, followed by
evidence that integration has a key function in semantic
memory. Finally, those studies which have specifically
investigated integration and inference in children will be
described.
Semantic Memory in Children
Interest in semantic aspects of memory has evolved
quite recently, perhaps as a result of Piaget's influence,
as well as some new developments in the adult cognitive
literature. Research on semantic memory is concerned with
how the organized knowledge a person has about concepts,
rules, meanings, etc. affects memory for information, rather
than with memory for specific, isolated, personal events
(or episodic memory). The distinction between semantic
and episodic memory was originally made by Tulving (1972),
primarily to clarify and distinguish some problems in memory
research, and is paralleled by Piaget and Inhelder's (197J)
distinction between "memory in the strict sense" and "memory
in the wider sense", the former being the analogue of episodic
memory, and the latter semantic memory. Most developmental
research to date has focused on children's episodic memory
and how capacities and strategies for encoding and retrieving
these episodic events change. If one inspects the literature,
one would find that in most of these studies of memory,
the experimental task is one where children are required
to recall or recognize isolated strings of words, pictures.
9or objects which are completely devoid of context and which
bear little relevance to real-world experiences. However,
it has become obvious to many investigators that a theory of
memory development must account not only for the increasing
ability of the child to remember arbitrary lists of stimuli,
but also for the remembering of more general, conceptual
knowledge involved in such things as the comprehension of
prose, the formulation and deployment of strategies in
episodic tasks, and other sorts of situations where context
and meaningfulness qualitatively change the nature of the
task for the "rememberer". The result has been a growth of
attention to semantic memory in children.
This interest has been enhanced by a framework for
thinking about memory provided by Craik and Lockhart (1972)
which places a great deal of emphasis on semantic processes.
Instead of taking the traditional information-processing
perspective of partitioning memory into a number of storage
compartments regulated by control processes, Craik and
Lockhart propose that memory be thought of as the product of
a particular "depth of processing". That is, the greater
the amount of semantic elaboration and extraction of meaning
from a particular stimulus, the stronger the memory trace
for that stimulus will be. Furthermore, a close correspondence
between existing cognitive structures and stimulus materials
facilitates a "deeper" level of processing. Thus, the
cognitive skills that a child possesses at a particular
10
developmental level take on considerable significance in
light of this model and pose interesting questions for devel-
opmental research. For example, if memory is, in fact, a
function of depth of processing, does depth of processing
change in any systematic way with age? More significantly,
what kinds of cognitive skills play a role at a particular
level of processing and when do they become functional?
These are some of the questions that research has begun to
address, including the research to be presented in this
paper.
Before considering this research in detail, however,
another widely-held view of the nature of memory, especially
the memory of very young children, should be presented,
since it further emphasizes the need to understand semantic
memory and the cognitive skills involved in that memory.
Several investigators have described memory in young children
as being largely involuntary (Flavell et al., 1970; smirnov
and Zinchenko, 1969; Yendovitskaya, 1971). Young children,
when they remember things, seem to be operating on an auto-
matic or spontaneous level, rather than deliberately acting
on material with the intention to remember it. The deter-
minants of memory involve the child's interest in and com-
prehension of an event (a semantic memory function) rather
than the awareness and use of deliberate strategic memory
skills. This notion was perhaps most concisely described by
Brown (1975a):
the child's level of intellectual developmentinteracts with the material to determine what falls
within the domain of semantic memory. If the
material is congruent with the child's operational
level, it will be perceived and retained as meaning-
ful, i.e., the task is semantic. If, however, the
child is insufficiently mature to perceive a logical
or meaningful structure in the material, he will
treat it as a meaningless situation and retention
will demand the application of deliberate memorial
skills." (p. 143)
The implication of Brown's statement is that a complete
understanding of memory processes in very young children,
presumably deficient in "deliberate memorial skills",
(Flavell et al., 1970; Smirnov and Zinchenko, 1969; Yendovitskaya
,
1971) would necessarily involve a description of semantic
processes. That is, if the act of remembering can be charac-
terized as involving one of two processes: 1) either an
extraction of meaning from the materials to be remembered
(which would be a semantic operation), or 2) the deployment
of strategies, mnemonics, etc., to insure memory in less
meaningful situations (as in episodic tasks), and very young
children are deficient in the latter, then their memory
functioning must be seen as being largely of a semantic
nature. If a meaningful structure is not extracted from the
material, and deliberate strategies for remembering are
absent, then the material will not be well remembered.' In
order to understand how very young children do remember,
then, it would appear to be essential to understand semantic
processing and more specifically, to pinpoint the kinds of
relationships and meanings they are capable of extracting and
what kinds of operational abilities are tied to them.
12
This last issue leads directly to the central focus of
this paper and will be discussed in greater depth in the
sections which follow. However, since the importance of
understanding semantic memory in children has been established
it would be useful, at this point, to assess some of the more
general features of children's semantic memory processing.
Several initial studies have clearly demonstrated that
children, like adults, do in fact extract meaningful rela-
tionships from material to which they have been exposed.
Paris and Carter (19 73), for example, presented second and
fifth graders with a series of stories each of which contained
sentences upon which inferential judgments could be made.
For example, one story contained the following sentences:
1. The bird is in the cage.
^• The cage is under the table.
Following story presentations, a recognition memory task was
presented in which some of the sentences incorporated infor-
mation from the initially presented sentences. In the above
example, one such test item was, "The bird is under the table.
In the recognition task, it was found that both groups of
children made a large number of false alarm responses to new
sentences which contained the true inference based on initial
premises. That is, children recognized as "old" new sentences
which had the same semantic content as the original sentences.
This finding suggests that children encode the meaning of,
rather than the direct lexical features of prose materials.
13
a finding which has already been established for adults
(Bransford and Franks, 1971; Bransford, Barclay, and Franks,
197z; Kintsch and Monk, 1972, for example). What is stored,
then, is not the discrete stimulus units which were presented,
but integrated units containing the stimulus information. A
similar finding is reported by Moeser (1976). In one portion
of her experiment, children ranging in age from 5 to 14 years
were presented with sentences upon which inferences could be
made. Again, a great number of false recognition responses
were made to test sentences which were true inference state-
ments.
Not only does semantic processing occur with respect to
verbal materials, it seems to be a viable phenomenon in
memory for visual materials, as well. Using a paradigm
similar to the Paris and Carter (1973) study, Paris and
Mahoney (1974) demonstrated that semantic operations were
being performed by children when pictures were used where
there was a potential for making an inference. Subjects
responded to pictures which depicted true inference informa-
tion based on initial premises as if they had already been
seen. They were apparently incorporating the original
information into meaningful, cohesive units, rather than
storing separate bits of static information.
Further evidence that children are sensitive to the
meaningful features of stimuli is provided by a series of
studies by Brown and her associates. In one task (Brown,
14
1975b), kindergarten and second grade children were told to
listen to a series of stories about a number of objects.
When these stories consisted of logical sequences of events,
verbal recall and reconstruction of the order of the narra-
tives (measured by the ordering of pictures for these events)
was consistently higher for both age groups than was memory
for unconnected events. In a similar study, Brown and Murphy
(1975) showed 4 year olds four pictures which depicted either
a logical or random sequence of events. Again, reconstruction
of logical sequences was far superior to that of random
sequences, especially as a function of lag. That is, even
when five intervening sets of sequences were involved,
memory for logical sequences remained at a high level, while
memory for random sequences declined. Even more dramatic
was another finding in a second portion of this same study.
When random sequences of pictures were accompanied by a
unifying story, memory for those sequences was far superior
to a similar set of random pictures which were unaccompanied
by a connective narrative. Brown (1975a) maintains that
subjects in these experiments were relying on processing via
the semantic memory system in those cases where connected
series of events (either logical or random) were involved,
whereas episodic memory was being tapped when random pic-
tures without a narrative were used. Her conclusion is that
even children who are at the preoperational stage of develop-
ment are capable of semantically integrating separate pieces
15
of information into meaningful, cohesive units which are
relatively resistant to decay.
There is also some initial evidence that children
younger than 5 years of age make contact with a semantic
memory system in an essentially episodic task. Perlmutter
and Myers (1976) showed 4 year old children a series of
slides of common objects, some of which were classified as
color-specific and others which were non-color specific. A
banana, for example, is considered to be a color-specific
item, since a particular color is strongly associated with it.
A mitten, on the other hand, could have any of a number of
colors associated with it. On initial presentation trials,
both classes of objects were shown either in black-and-white
or in their associated color values. In the recognition
portion of the task, children were asked to choose from
among four alternatives the stimulus they had seen. Numerous
errors were made in the forced choice task. In particular,
children tended to choose color-specific items in their
associated color values as those which had already been
seen, even though those items had initially been presented
in black-and-white. Thus, even very young children have a
network of knowledge about particular objects which strongly
influences their memory for those objects.
These initial studies have clearly shown that children,
even as young as 4 years of age, are bringing to experimental
situations some organized knowledge which has definite effects
16
on their memory performance. Information which has meaning
to the child is very likely to be retained, while information
which is meaningless will not be.
The Role of Integration in Semantic Memory
Given that children are quite capable of semantic
processing of stimulus materials and that this process is
hypothesized to intersect with memory performance, it would
be useful to return to the previously raised problem of more
precisely delineating the kinds of operations children are
performing in their extraction of meaning from a given set of
information. That is, what are the specific component pro-
cesses that are involved in the tasks described above, how
do they interact with the stimulus materials, and how do
they change with age? These questions are particularly
important if one subscribes to some of the theoretical
notions that have already been mentioned — namely, that
1) the child actively operates on information as a function
of his cognitive skills at a particular level of development
(Piaget and Inhelder, 197j; Brown, 1975a) and 2) the nature
of the activity of the child influences memory for an event
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Smirnov and Zinchenko, 1969;
Yendovitskaya, 1971).
One important function which is implicated by some of
the above findings and which both Brown (1975a) and Paris
(1975) have focused on is the ability to integrate a set of
information into a meaningful cohesive unit. One way in
17
which this integrative process has been described has been
in terms of making "inferences". Children appear to extract
logical relationships from stimulus events and use their
inferential reasoning capacities to construct an integrated
meaningful whole which is then the unit of storage. That
such a process occurs has already been proposed in the
Paris and Carter (197J), Paris and Mahoney (1974), and Moeser
(1976) studies. The effect that inference-making has on
memorial processes has been demonstrated even more explicitly
in a study by Paris and Upton (1974). Kindergarten through
fifth grade children listened to a series of stories, the
substance of which contained information upon which inferences
could be made. After listening to each story, subjects were
asked a series of questions, some of which required the
retention of verbatim information and some of which required
the making of an inference in order to answer correctly.
The following is a sample of a story and the questions asked
about it:
"Linda was playing with her new doll in front of
her big red house. Suddenly she heard a strange
sound coming from under the porch. It was the
flapping of wings. Linda wanted to help so much,
but she did not know what to do. She ran inside
the house and grabbed a shoe box from the closet.
Then Linda looked inside her desk until she found
,
eight sheets of yellow paper. She cut up the
paper into little pieces and put them in the
bottom of the box. Linda gently picked up the
helpless creature and took it with her. Her
teacher knew what to do.
1. VJas Linda's doll new?
2. Did Linda grab a match box?
3. Was the strange sound coming from under the
porch?
18
4. Was Linda playing behind her house?
5. Did Linda like to take care of animals?
6. Did Linda take what she found to the police
station?
7. Did Linda find a frog?
8. Did Linda use a pair of scissors?"
The first four questions require the retention of verbatim
information, whereas the last four require the making of an
inference. Interestingly, children made more correct responses
to the inference than verbatim questions. Also, even though
the tendency to make inferences improved steadily with age,
even kindergarten children were responding correctly at a
relatively high level. In a second portion of this task,
children v;ere asked to recall as much of the material from
the original passages as they could, their recall being
measured in terms of "idea units". The results showed that
recall of "idea units" was significantly related to the
tendency to make inferences, even when age was eliminated as
a factor in analysis. That is, the tendency to make inferences
was the single best predictor of recall within each age group.
This finding fits in nicely with Craik and Lockhart's notion
of depth of processing in that a particular cognitive skill,
the tendency to make inferences, coincided with the strength
of memory traces. Presumably, as the child grows older,
her cognitive skills, in this case his ability to make
inferences, more closely match stimulus information to
facilitate a deeper level of processing, and hence, recall.
Paris' (1975) position is that this operation of making
inferences is one facet of semantic elaboration that is
19
probably critical for the comprehension and retention of
prose materials. Not only does it induce a deeper level of
processing, but it provides the memorizer with a richer
source of cues for retrieval.
In addition, inference-making connotes some active
operation on the part of the subject in his intake of
stimulus information. The fact that energy is expended
somewhere in the encoding process may act to further insure
the durability of memory for that information. Several
studies of paired-associate learning in adults have demon-
strated that when subjects actively supply either a mediator
between stimulus and response items ( Bobrow and Bower, 1969)
or generate the response items themselves, recall is facili-
tated (Anderson, Goldberg and Middle, 1971). In this last
study, for example, some subjects were required to fill in
the blank to sentences such as "Elevators stop at every
, " while others simply read sentences where the blank
was already filled in (i.e., "Elevators stop at every floor.")
Subjects in the first group recalled many more S-R pairs in
a subsequent test than did subjects in the second group.
These findings are very much in line with the Piagetian and
Soviet thinking that the activity of the subject is of prime
importance in memory tasks, so that "involuntary remembering
of objects occurs in cases where subjects have had to deal
actively with them" (Smirnov and Zinchenko, 1969). Inference
and integration may constitute just such an activity.
20
Here, then, is one cognitive operation which is strongly
implicated as having effects on memory. Certainly, there
are many others which have yet to be determined. Yet, this
particular skill seems to be so potent and influential that
it merits further attention.
ypunq Children's Integration Skills
The fact that children improve in their inference and
integration skills as they grow older (Paris and Upton, 1974)
does not mean that young children are incapable of semantic
integration at all. Rather, integration skills seem to be a
good candidate in a search for what operations very young
"involuntary" rememberers use in their "activities" with
stimulus information. If the ability to co-ordinate infor-
mation is a basic cognitive mechanism, then it could also
very well be an important factor in the comprehension and
memory of very young children, too. Unfortunately, lengthy
prose passages, such as those used in the Paris et al,
studies probably exceed the processing capacity of young
children, and do not give a fair assessment of their ability
to integrate. Pascual-Leone (1970), for example, maintains
that there is a limit to the number of pieces of information
which can be operated on in a hypothesized central processing
space at each developmental level. Also, another problem
presents itself regarding what the nature of the integrative
operation is in the different experiments described thusfar.
Some of these tasks required distinctly different operations
^1
on the part of the child than others. In the Paris and Upton
(1974) study, for example, the inference task demanded that
the child co-ordinate information from stories with his
broader knowledge of environmental relations (e.g., if the
creature that Linda found was flapping its wings, it was not
a frog). in this instance, to make the "inference", the
child had to supply a component of the information to be co-
ordinated from his knowledge of animals and their charac-
teristics. In the Paris and Carver (1973) study, however,
all of the information to be co-ordinated was already supplied.
Both of these tasks required an integrative operation, but
the second supplied more of the necessary information than
the first. If one is going to describe integration as being
an important cognitive mechanism, at some point, a decision
has to be made as to the precise meaning of that term. The
interest in the present study is specifically in the ability
of the child to co-ordinate (or integrate two pieces of infor-
mation which are already available to him. By simplifying
task demands in terms of presenting all the necessary infor-
mation to the child in passages that do not exceed processing
capacity, it might be possible to demonstrate that even very
young children have the ability to integrate, and that this
ability has its concommitant effects on memory.
There are some studies in the developmental literature
which have found that very young children cannot integrate.
Actually, these studies have again used the term "inference"
to describe the behaviors in question, but since they do
22
deal with children's ability to co-ordinate information
which is already available to them, they bear relevance to
the present discussion. There have been two major lines
of research here — one dealing with "inferences" in a
problem-solving situation and one pertaining to "inferences"
in perceptual judgments. With respect to the first of these,
there is a series of studies done by Kendler and Kendler
(1961, 196^, 1967) which is pertinent. In the standard
experiment, the Kiendlers had children learn two response
patterns to criterion. One was to press a red panel on one
side of the apparatus to obtain a marble and a blue panel on
the oth^r side to get a ball bearing. The second response
to be learned was to deposit one of these objects, the
marble or ball bearing, into a center panel in order to
obtain a small toy. After these response patterns were well-
learned, children were simply told to obtain the toy, a
response which required the integration of the two previously
learned response patterns. Five year old children did very
poorly in this task in that they were unable to co-ordinate
the two appropriate response patterns they had initially
learned in order to obtain the toy. The Kendlers concluded
that "the capacity to combine independently acquired habit
segments is present in very few youngsters below 6 years of
age" (Kendler, 1963, p. 47). In other words,
young children do not have the ability to integrate infor-
mation in order to solve a problem.
^3
The second line of research has been concerned with
inferential reasoning in children's perceptual judgments.
Most of this research has stemmed from Piagefs theoretical
views, his major point being that children who have not reached
the stage of concrete operations (around 7 to 8 years of age)
do not have the logical structures that direct inferential
reasoning. The typical task upon which this theoretical
view is based involves showing the child two rods, one of
which is longer than the other, i.e. A> B. Next, he is
shown B along with another rod, D, where B>C. The child is
then asked to describe the relationship between A and C, a
judgment which involves the integration of two pieces of
information already available to him. Almost always, children
under the age of 7 years are not able to make this "transi-
tive inference" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969).
Another study, however, provides evidence that children
can integrate information in perceptual tasks when memory
for the initial relations is high. Bryant and Trabasso
(1971) showed children five rods of varying lengths (A, B,
C, D, and E) and had them learn the relationships between
every two adjacent rods (i.e., A>B, B >C, etc.) during the
training phase. This training to perfect responding insured
that children would not fail in the integration task because
they forgot the content of the original comparisons. Subjects
were then asked to make comparisons among all ten possible
combinations of pairs of rods, the critical comparison for
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integration being the B-D pair. Children at all three age
levels (4, 5, and 6 years of age) made the "transitive
inference" in the B versus D situation at levels significantly
above chance. A second experiment was run to eliminate the
possibility that children viere simply remembering the absolute
sizes of rods B and D when they were responding. Here, children
learned the relationships between adjacent pairs of rods
where only equal portions of the rods were visible, so that
they could not be learning their absolute lengths. Once
again, even 4 year olds made the transitive inference to the
B-D pair 8z% of the time, a level which is significantly
above chance. These data suggest that even pre-operational
children have the structures necessary to integrate informa-
tion, and that previous failures to demonstrate this phenomenon
may have been due to subjects • forgetting of the original
relationships among the rods.
One aspect of these studies which should be noted is
that they involve a deliberate, logical process of considering
premise information and then operating on it in a rather
formal manner in order to reach a conclusion. This kind of
process seems to be less automatic and spontaneous than the
integration involved in the comprehension of simple prose
passages or even in the integration of two pieces of arbi-
trary information, as was required in the Kendler and
Kendler (1961, 1963, 1967) studies. Ultimately, the specific
components of integration of prose materials may be the same
as those involved in more formal logical reasoning (that is.
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remembering initial premises and combining them to derive a
conclusion), but the Kendler and perceptual judgment tasks
seem to require an awareness on the part of the child that
a particular strategy is necessary in order to solve the
problem. Although a child may be quite capable of performing
the strategy itself, he may not have the problem-solving
orientation which would lead him to call forth that skill.
That is, the information provided by the experimenter to the
child is not sufficiently detailed or clear enough for him
to produce the necessary integration response on cue. If
so, deficits in performance in more formal reasoning tasks
may reflect a production deficiency similar to that which is
found in the memory literature (Flavell, Beach, and Chinsky,
1966), rather than an absence of integrative abilities.
One other body of literature is peripherally relevant
to the question of children's integrative abilities, and
should be mentioned at this point, since it strongly suggests
that at least some rudimentary ability to co-ordinate infor-
mation at the sensorimotor level does exist even under the
age of two years. This literature is concerned with the
Piatetian notion of invisible displacements in the develop-
ment of the object concept. Piaget (1954) has traced the
child's growing realization that objects continue to exist
despite variations in location and time through the search
behavior of the child when those objects are hidden. For
instance, in Stages I and II of the development of the object
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concept, the child will not actively search for objects that
disappear from his field of view. In Stage II, the child's
emergent awareness of the permanence of objects is evidenced
by the fact that he will search for objects that are partially
hidden. If a cloth covers an object so that part of it is
exposed, the child will lift the cloth to reveal the whole
object. By Stage IV, in this same situation, the child
lifts a cloth covering an object, even when the object was
covered entirely. In Stage V, the child is able to follow
visible displacements of an object, so that if it is first
hidden in location 1 and then in location he will search
in location z for the object, provided he has seen the object's
displacement. Finally, in Stage VI, the object concept has
become so firmly established that the child can follow
invisible displacements of the object. If the object is
moved from location 1 to location 2, the child will search
in location even if he hasn't actually seen the displace-
ment. Most research on object permanence has been concerned
with the earlier stages and has generally verified Piaget's
findings (Miller, Cohen, and Hill, 1970; Gratch and Landers,
1971; Harris, 1971, for example). It is the behavior in
Stage VI which is pertinent to the present discussion of.
integration, however. The child's search behavior in Stage
VI can be interpreted as involving the co-ordination of two
pieces of information to derive a conclusion. The following
example from Piaget's work serves to illustrate this point:
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me
"OBS. 64. I. At l;7(^0) Jacqueline watches
when I put a coin in my hand, then put my hand
under a coverlet. I withdraw my hand closed;
Jacqueline opens it, then searches under the
coverlet until hse finds the object." (Piaaet
1954, p. 88) ^
vt^iag r.
The fact that the child searched for the coin under the
coverlet implies that some form of integration occurred —
the information that the coin was no longer in the hand,
and that it had also been under the coverlet was co-ordinated
to derive the conclusion that the coin was still under the
coverlet. Thus, even pre-verbal children may have some
limited ability to integrate information that is nonverbal
in nature.
To summarize thusfar, a number of studies have already
shown that even 4 year olds extract meaningful relationships
from stimulus materials (Brown and Murphy, 1975; Perlmutter
and Myers, 1976), and that memory in those cases where they
do may even exceed memory for more episodic events (Paris
and Upton, 1974). The focus of subsequent research has been
on delineating those cognitive activities and operations which
the child uses to extract those meaningful relationships.
One skill which appears to be important is the ability to
make inferences, an integrative activity which serves an
elaborative function in encoding and retrieval of information.
Although the use of the term "inference" has been ambiguous,
one could define the cognitive skill in question as the ability
to co-ordinate two pieces of information which are already
available. Using this definition, it is reasonable to suppose
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that the cognitive skill of integration is an important aspect
of cognitive functioning, even in children who are much younger
than 4 years of age. The Piagetian literature on transitivity
and the Kendler experiments would lead one to believe that
this is not the case. However, failure to control for
memory for initial relations in the former situation and
possible production deficiencies in calling forth problem-
solving strategies in both situations might result in mis-
leading conclusions. The child's performance in Stage VI of
object permanence suggests that some basic ability to inte-
grate is present even under the age of two years. Weighing
all the evidence, there is good reason to believe that inte-
gration of verbal materials is a cognitive skill which even
very young children possess and that it may be an important
skill in influencing memory.
The Present Study
The purpose of the research presented here is to
investigate the operation of integration of verbal materials
and its relationship to memory in a group of children sub-
stantially younger than those used in previous experiments.
If young children's memory is largely semantic in nature
and the ability to semantically integrate information is as
fundamental to the constructive processes of memory as Paris
(1975) and Brown ( 1975a) believe, then integration skills
should be present, at least in rudimentary form, at the
point where children are becoming relatively facile with
language — at the age of 2^ years or so. Even though Paris
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and Upton (1974) found that kindergarten children made fewer
inferences than older subjects, it could be that they were
still capable of integrating information. As was previously
mentioned, the task in that experiment placed greater demands
on the child in that he had to supply some of the information
which had to be co-ordinated from his knowledge of world
events and relations. Also, rather long stories were used
in this study, and it is possible that this much information
exceeded the processing capacity of their younger subjects.
It might very well be the case that if the task is modified
in a few ways, even 2^ year olds might demonstrate the ability
to integrate. These modifications would include: 1) pre-
senting a task where all of the information to be integrated
is already present so that the child's experience with
rather sophisticated relations would not have to be drawn
upon; 2) reducing the length of the prose material used to
present the information to be integrated, so that limits in
processing space would not be a factor; and 3) supplementing
the verbal materials with interesting objects illustrating
those materials, so that interest in and attention to the
task would be more likely. This last modification is especially
important for very young children, who tend to become dis-
interested in tasks where solely verbal materials are used.
By instituting these modifications, it might be possible to
get a more accurate assessment of children's integrative
skills at a very young age, thereby adding valuable informa-
tion to our knowledge of what cognitive skills children this
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age are able to use when dealing with simple prose materials.
Therefore, the first question to be addressed in the present
study is whether 2\ year old children are capable of integrat-
ing information presented in simple prose passages.
A second area of interest is in examining how the
ability to integrate information develops. Perhaps the
structures which direct integration are shaped and solidified
by the child's having had a great deal of experience with
certain premises and their conclusions in day to day events
until the structures themselves gradually become useable
independent of specific contents. The growing ability to
apply those structures may be tied to repeated experiences
with implied relationships in concrete, everyday situations.
Such a notion of structures becoming "content-free" can
be traced back to William James' (1890) "law of dissociation
by varying concommitants". James describes the process as
follows:
"IVhat is now associated with one thing and now
with another tends to become dissociated from
either, and to grow into an object of abstract
contemplation by the mind... The practical result
of it will be to allow the mind which has thus
dissociated and abstracted a character to analyze
it out of a total whenever it meets with it again."
(p. 506)
Applying this line of thinking to the development of integra-
tion structures, one could hypothesize that the way in which
integrative capacities develop is through varying experience
with antecedent-consequent events which involve combining
information. For example, a young child may have had a great
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deal of experience with finding milk in a carton and seeing
the carton in the refrigerator, so that an intention to find
milk would lead him to look in the refrigerator. Similarly,
he may have seen cookies in a box, and the box in the cup-
board, so his search for cookies would lead him to the cup-
board. In other words, to find the designated objects, he
has to co-ordinate two separate pieces of information which
are already available to him. Actually finding the objects
in their hypothesized locations serves to solidify the
appropriateness of using the integrative operation in those
types of situations. By noticing the contiguous relationships
between separate bits of information and finding their con-
sistent conclusions, the child may be building the basic
skills involved in integrative reasoning. As these cognitive
structures become more and more consolidated from additional
use, they might then become functional regardless of the
specific contents of the information, so that they could be .
applied to relationships which have never been experienced
before. The second purpose of this study, then, is to
determine whether 2'^'j< year old children are more likely to
make integrative responses to situations congruent with
everyday experiences than those that are not. Additionally,
it would be interesting to see if a group of older children
{V^2 years of age) are less tied to the congruent situations
than are younger children when they are required to integrate.
Such a finding would be expected if it is true that the
cognitive structures for integration are becoming more "conten
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free" with development.
Finally, the question of whether having to make an
integrative response induces a deeper level of processing
to facilitate memory will be considered. If Craik and
Lockhart (1972) and the Soviet psychologists are correct,
children who have had to actively operate on material in
terms of integrating information should have better memory
for that information. Such a finding would be consistent
with the results of the Paris and Upton (1974) study, where
memory was closely tied to an integrative operation. Here,
the consideration is whether the integrative operation on
material has this effect on memory in very young children,
as well.
Experiment
The major questions that were examined in Experiment I
and the preductions associated with them are as follows:
1) Are year old children who are operating on a
verbal level of capable of integrating two pieces of infor-
mation presented in simple prose passages? By simplifying,
the task demands so that capacity of memory or processing
space were minimized as factors, and by using interesting
stimuli to maintain children's interest, it was hoped that
this data could be obtained. The prediction was that 2\
year old children do have the ability to co-ordinate verbal
information since this skill may be a part of even very basic
day to day experiences.
m:53
^) Is the ability to integrate information dependent on
that information being congruent with usual expectations or
everyday experiences, especially for younger children? In
this study, the hypothesis was that 2h year olds would be
ore likely to integrate material that was compatible with
their experience than material where the relationships among
items were arbitrary. Older children, however, should
perform equally well in either case, as they have had a
greater amount of practice with this cognitive operation,
making it relatively independent of contents.
Preliminary Experiment
Prior to conducting Experiment I, it was necessary to
construct the congruent and noncongruent stimulus materials
and to establish how appropriate they were for testing the
second hypothesis described above. The general nature of the
task in Experiment I was to have children play a search game
where they first learned to find six containers in each of
six buildings, after which they were to find six more objects
in the same buildings. In this second phase, however,
children were not told directly the buildings in which the
objects were hidden; rather they were told the locations of
the objects relative to the containers. In order to respond
successfully, children had to integrate the object-container
relation with the container-location relation. Some of these
relations were congruent; that is, the object-container and
container-location items corresponded to real-world relations
34
with which children should be familiar. Others were non-
congruent
— the object-container and container-location
items were paired arbitrarily. However, it was important
that the congruent relations not be so highly associated
that children would search for objects in particular loca-
tions without using the container-location information.
Therefore, the purpose of this preliminary study was to
make sure that congruent items were not so strongly related
that children would look for objects without using any
mediating information.
Subjects
. Five i\ year old and 10 31^ year old children
participated in this study, with 2 boys and 3 girls in the
first group and 5 boys and 5 girls in the second group.
Younger subject ranged in age from 2 years, 4 months to 2
years, 6 months (X = 2 years, 5 months), which older subjects
ranged in age from 3 years, 4 months to 3 years, 6 months
(X = 3 years, 5 months). Subjects came from middle to
upper-middle class families residing in the Amherst, Massa-
chusetts area who had already participated in other experi-
ments as part of a project on early cognitive development at
the University of Massachusetts.
Apparatus and stimuli . The apparatus consisted of two
sets of six plastic buildings constructed to scale as part
of railroad modeling kits. These buildings were approximately
6" X 4" X 4" in size and had a space in the center in which
objects could be hidden. Buildings were arranged linearly
on a child-size table so that they were all visible and within
easy reach of the subjects.
^5
In addition, 24 small plastic toys representing common
objects were used. Twelve of these were items which were
containers (e.g., pail, cup, plate) and Iz were objects
which could be placed in those containers (e.g., key, flower,
book). These toys were sufficiently small so that their
placement under a building could not be detected without
lifting the building. The small toys were kept out of the
view of the child until it was time to use them in the
experimental task.
P^siq'^ and procedure
. Each child received two blocks
of trials, with six locations being used in each block.
Within each block, there were two subsets of trials the
first six trials tested for preferences in locating con-
tainers, and the second six tested for preferences in locating
the remaining six objects. Table 1 shows the sets of items
used in the two blocks of trials. Within the subsets of
trials, containers and objects were presented randomly to
subjects. Order of presentation of the sets was also
randomized across subjects.
Children were brought individually into the experimental
room where they were shown the six buildings from the first
set arranged linearly on a table. The experimenter named
each building for the subject and then asked the child to
point to each building as it was named. If the child made an
error, he was shown the correct building and was asked to
locate it once more after all the other buildings had been
named. The six small toys which were containers were then
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put on the table, and again, the child was asked to point
to each one as it was named. The containers were then
hidden in their designated locations while the child was
busy playing with a puzzle. Subjects were then asked to
guess the location of each container. If the subject made an error
(or noncongruent choice) he was not permitted to see the
object; otherwise, he was. Following these trials, the
six remaining objects for a set were placed on the table and
identified by the child. Again, children were distracted
while these objects were hidden in their designated locations
and were then asked to guess the location of each object.
This entire procedure was repeated for the second set of
locations, containers, and objects.
Results
. The dependent measure used to analyze these
data was the number of responses children made where the
location chosen was the congruent location for the items.
Table 2 shows the mean number of congruent choices for
container-location and object-location trials. It should be
noted that the data of major interest is for object-location
trials, since it was desirable to not have objects so highly
associated with particular locations that the child could
find the object by looking directly under the related location.
Older children did make more congruent choices than younger
children, the means for these groups being 1.58 and 1.05
for older and younger children, respectively. Also, slightly
more congruent choices were made on container-location trials
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(X = 1.57) than on object-location trials (X = 1.02).
Furthermore, slightly more correct responses were made to
Set I items (X = 1.53) than to Set II items (X = 1.03).
However, a 2 (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (set) analysis of variance
(where set was a repeated measure) performed on each of the
trial types indicated that no factor was significant. Table
3 illustrates the results of these analyses.
The major question, of course, was whether any of these
levels of responding differed significantly from chance.
First, the data were inspected to see if there were any
trends of increased responses to congruent items toward the
latter portions of presentation trials in all blocks and all
trial types. An increase in responding could indicate that
the level of chance responding was not equal for every trial,
and that subjects were not sampling from the total set of
locations with replacement on each presentation. Figure 1
shows the mean number of responses which were scored as
congruent for each block and trial type. As can be seen,
there was a slight tendency for 3% year olds to improve in
performance on later trials in Blocks I and II for container-
location responses, and for 2^ year olds to improve in Block
II for container-location responses and Block I for object-
location responses. To see if there was any significant
improvement in performance over trials, t_-tests were per-
formed on the data for the first three trials versus the
second three trials for all blocks and all trial types. The
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Table 3
Summary of analysis of variance
for congruent choices
Source of variance df MS F
I. Container-location responses
Age (A) 1 0.47 0.22
Sex (X) 1 0.07 O.Oj
AX 1 6.14 2.82
S(AX ) 11 2.18
Set (T) 1 0.14 0.05
AT 1 0.47 0.17
TX 1 0.07 O.OJ
ATX 1 0.00 0.00
ST (AX) 11 2. 72
II. Object-location re la t ions
Age (A) 1 4.01 3.84
Sex (X) 1 0.01 0.01
AX 1 0.90 0.85
S(AX) 11 1.05
Set (T) 1 0.54 3.27
AT 1 0.01 0.07
TX 1 0.54 3.27
ATX 1 0.01 0.06
ST (AX
)
11 0.17
FIGURE 1
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data for the first and second halves of trials are presented
in Table 4. The only significant differences were for con-
tainer-location trials, where year olds made more correct
responses in the first half of the trials than the second
half in Block I (t ^ 4.0, df = 4, £^..0^) and 3^? year olds
made more correct responses in the second half than in the
first half in Block I (t = 2.69, df = 9, £^.05). However,
these findings did not present problems in analyzing responses
for object-location trials, where it could be assumed that
chance level responding remained constant over trials.
Since there were six possible chances for each set of six
trials, chance level was assumed to equal .167. t_-tests on
the means for each age group for object-location responses
indicated that in no case did responding exceed chance level.
Therefore, the results showed that the congruent relations
were not so strongly associated that children would find
objects in locations without considering intervening infor-
mation. Experiment I was then carried out.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 20 2\ year old and 20 3^-^ year old children,
with equal numbers of boys and girls in each age group*
Subjects in the younger group ranged in age from 2 years, 5
months to 2 years, 7 months, with a mean age of 2 years,
6 months. Older subjects ranged in age from i years, 5 months
to 3 years, 6 months, their mean age being 3 years, 6 months.
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An additional 8 subjects were replaced, one 3^-^ year old
boy because he did not talk yet, and 7 2% year olds who
either did not show any interest in the game (N = ^) or wh
did not complete the entire task (N = 5). There were 5
girls and 2 boys in this last group.
Children were drawn from a sample of middle class famili
in Springfield, Massachusetts, who expressed an interest in
participating in the project. Many of these children had
already participated in other experiments as part of an
ongoing project in early cognitive development at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Child Study Center.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The same apparatus was used as in the preliminary
experiment described above.
Design
The format of this experiment was that of a "finding
game" consisting of two phases an acquisition portion and
a set of integration trials. In acquisition, children
learned to find six containers in each of six buildings.
Once the locations of each of the containers were learned to
criterion (acquisition), children were requested to find six
other objects, each located in one of the containers (inte-
gration). On the six integration trials, the location of. the
objects was not directly told to the subject; rather, the
child was only told in which container the object was hidden.
To successfully locate the object, the child had to integrate
es
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the information about the object-container relationship with
the location of the container that was learned during acquisi-
tion. For example, a child might have learned during acquisi-
tion that "the car is in the gas station". Later, during
integration trials, he was told, "The key is in the car.
Find the key". To find the object, the child had to combine
these two pieces of information.
Acquisition and integration trials were presented for
two blocks of trials. For year olds, six different
locations were used in each block of trials — those belonging
to Set I and Set II described in Table 1. However, pilot
testing had indicated that 2\ year olds would have trouble
finishing a task this long. Therefore, this age group received
a block of six trials followed by a block of four. Again,
Sets I and II were used for each block, but two items were
eliminated for the second block. Set I was presented first
for half the subjects and second for the other half.
Within a block, the six container-location pairs used
in acquisition and the six object-location pairs used in
integration trials were such that half were congruent rela-
tions (see Table 1) and half were noncongruent . These last
relations were constructed by randomly pairing items that
remained in a set after the congruent relations were chosen.
The assignment of items to the congruent condition was done
so that particular congruent relations were presented
equally often across subjects in each age group. One congruent
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and one noncongruent item were randomly eliminated for the
2H year olds, who received only four trials in Set II. The
design of this experiment was a i (age) x 2 (sex) x i (con-
gruency) model with congruency as a repeated measures factor.
Procedure
Each subject was tested individually in an experimental
room located across the corridor from a playroom in which he
awaited the experimenter. After the experimenter had familiarized
herself with the child by playing with him for a short while,
she invited him to play a "finding game" across the hall.
Parents accompanied their children into the experimental
room.
Acquisition trials
. The child was shown the array of
buildings in front of him and was asked to point to each
building as the experimenter named it for him. If the subject
made an error in finding the building, the experimenter
corrected him and asked him to find it again both immediately
and after all the other buildings had been named. The six
containers for that set of trials were next brought out of a
small box and placed on a small table directly behind the
child. Once again, the subject was asked to point to each
container as the experimenter named it. As before, if the
subject made an error, he was corrected, asked to point to
the item once more, and again after all the toys had been
identified. The subject was told that each of these toys
would be hidden in a particular building and was invited to
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help place the containers inside the buildings. The experiment
gave the child a container and told him to place it in the
specified building until all the toys were hidden. As the
subject placed a container in a building, the experimenter
repeated verbally the location of Lhe container (e.g., "See,
the car is in the gas station.").
The child was then asked to find each of the hidden
containers. For example, the experimenter would say "Where's
the car?". A correct response required the subject to locate
the building in which the container was located and lift it
up to expose it. Every time a correct response was made, the
subject received a small goldfish cracker which he could eat
or deposit in a bag to take home. If an error was made, the
subject was shown the correct location of the item.
The order of presentation of the learning trials was
random with the constraint that each of the six containers be
presented in a block of six trials. A dropout procedure was
used in an attempt to equate levels of learning for the
various container-location relations. Thus, after two
successive correct responses were made in locating a parti-
cular item, that container was dropped from the presentation
list. However, after all items were learned to criterion,
all six containers were presented once again to make sure
that all of the container-location relations had been learned.
If the subject missed an item on this final presentation set,
he was asked once again to locate that item. By using a
rather stringent criterion for acquisition, it was felt that
er
48
forgetting of initial container-location relations would be
minimized in the test of integration performance.
Integration trials. Following the acquisition phase,
the subject was shown six more objects on the table behind him.
After he had correctly identified each of them, he was told
that these toys, too, would be hidden in each of the buildings.
The subject was given a number of beads to put on a string
while the experimenter hid the items in the various containers.
The six integration trials followed. The child was asked to
find each object following a single verbal instruction that
contained only information about the object's location rela-
tive to a container. For example, if he had learned that
there was a car in the gas station, the instruction on the
integration trial was, "The key is in the car. Find the key."
The subject was to go to the correct building and lift it up
to reveal the specified object. If, however, he approached
and touched the wrong building, the experimenter prevented
him from lifting it up to avoid his possibly seeing the
location of an object yet to be tested. After the subject
completed all six integration trials, he was asked to locate
the containers for each object-container pair he had not
successfully found. The purpose of this post-test was to
determine if failure to locate objects on integration trials
could in part be a function of memory loss for the locations
of containers, that is, memory loss for one of the components
required to produce an integrative response.
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After completion of these trials, the first block of
locations was replaced by the second, and the same procedure
was followed once more for both acquisition and integration
trials. Again, the only variation occurred for the 2\ year
olds, for whom only four acquisition and integration trials
were given.
Results
Acquisition Trials
The first question of interest was whether there were
any differences in learning the initial container-location
pairs. The dependent measure used in these analyses was the
number of trials presented until criterion was reached for
each item summed over congruent and noncongruent conditions.
Thus, the minimum score to reach criterion would be nine
trials for each condition when there were six locations in
a block (three congruent and three noncongruent pairs, each
with a minimum of three trials to reach criterion), and six
trials for each condition when there were four locations in
a block (two congruent and two noncongruent pairs, each with
a minimum of three trials to reach criterion). A complete
listing of the mean number of trials to criterion as a function
of age, set, and congruency for each block of trials is -shown
in Table 5. It should be noted that the number of locations
presented in Block II for 2% year olds was four, rather than
six, and there is, accordingly, a marked decline in the
number of trials to criterion on Block II for 2\ year olds.
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To compare the number of learning trials to criterion
for younger and older subjects, an analysis was performed on
the data from the first block of locations. This restriction
to the first block only was necessitated by the fact that
the two age groups had unequal numbers of locations in the
second block. Not surprisingly, year olds took more trials
to reach criterion than 31? year olds, the mean number of
trials to criterion being 15.08 and 1^.03, for younger and
older children, respectively. However, since completely
errorless responding would take nine trials in Block I, both
groups of children were learning the locations of containers
quite rapidly (X = 13.55). Learning took slightly longer for
noncongruent items (X = 13. 9i) than congruent items (X =13.18).
The particular set of items also did not make much difference
in learning; the mean number of trials to criterion for Set
1 was 13.93 versus 13.18 for Set II. A 2 (age) x 2 (sex) x
2 (set) X 2 (congruency) repeated measures analysis of
variance was computed on these data to test for significant
effects of these factors. As Table 6 illustrates, the only
significant factor to emerge was age, where F (1, 32) = 14.22,
£ OOOl.
An analysis was also performed comparing learning in
Blocks I and II for J% year olds to see if there were any
fatigue or practice effects. A 2 (sex) x 2 (block) x 2 (con-
gruency) repeated measures analysis of variance showed that
block was not a significant factor and entered into no
significant interactions.
Table 6
Summary of analysis of variance for number
of trials to criterion
oource of variance df MS
Age (A) 1 186.05
Sex (X) 1 18.05
Set (T) 1 11.^5
Congruency (C) 1 11. ,^5
AX 1 7.^0
AT 1 5.00
XT 1 1.80
AC 1 0.80
XC 1 0.20
TC 1 5.00
AXT 1 0.50
AXC 1 2.45
ATC 1 0.45
XTC 1 0.05
S(AXT) 32 13.08
AXTC 1 5.00
SC(AXT) 32 6.21
14.22
1.38
1.81
*p .001
56
Integration Trials
The data of major interest in this experiment, of course,
were children's responses on the integration trials. If
children correctly located objects at a level significantly
above chance on these trials, they had to perform some inte-
grative operation, since they were never directly given the
location of objects. The object-container information given
on a test trial had to be co-ordinated with the container-
location information which had been learned in acquisition
in order for a correct response to occur. Table 7 shows
the mean proportion of integration responses as a function
of age, set, and congruency. A proportion measure was chosen
so that all the data could be incorporated in the analyses,
despite the unequal number of test trials in the second block
for the two age groups. A z (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (block)
analysis of variance indicated that performance on integration
trials did not vary as a function of block, so that the pro-
portion scores were not affected by set size differences for
2h year olds and could be summed over blocks. In general,
all subjects were responding at very high levels, with older
children performing somewhat better than younger children
(mean proportion correct = .77 and .67, respectively). -In
fact 10 subjects, 5 in each age group, made no errors at all
in integration trials for a particular block of trials. Both
groups of children made slightly more integration responses
in Set I (mean proportion = .75) than Set II (mean proportion
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.69). Furthermore, younger children made more integrations
to congruent items (mean proportion =
. 73 ) than to noncongruent
items (mean proportion = .60), while older children responded
at approximately equal levels in both conditions (mean pro-
portion = .75. for congruent items and .79 for noncongruent
items )
.
A major concern in analyzing these data was determining
if the proportion of integration responses exceeded chance
levels. Since the data from the preliminary experiment in-
dicated that performance would be at essentially the level
of chance when children were simply guessing the locations of
objects, any deviation from chance in the present study could
be interpreted as evidence for integration. First, though,
it was necessary to establish that children were sampling
from the set of locations with replacement on each integration
trial — that they were not using a problem-solving strategy
of ruling out locations already chosen in their responding
on earlier trials. If subjects were using such a strategy,
one would expect to see a gradual increase in correct responding
over trials. Figure 2, illustrating the mean number of inte-
gration responses over trials, indicates that this is not
the case. Levels of responding remained fairly constant
over trials. To verify this impression, the total number of
integration responses was summed over the first and second
halves of each block for each age group and t_-tests were
performed on the means to test for significant differences.
FIGURE 2
Mean number of correct responses on integration trials
as a function of age, block, and trials
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Table 8 shows the mean number of integration responses for
each half of the total trials within a block. For ^J, year
olds, the number of correct responses did not vary from the
first half of the trials to the second for either Block I or
Block II, t = 0.00, df = 19 and t = 0.74, df = 19, respectively
for Blocks I and II. For 3 h year olds, responding between
the first and second halves of the trials was also not
significantly different for Block I, ^ = 1.6j, d£ = 19,
This difference was significant, however, for Block II, t =
2.29, df = 19, £^.0^. But this difference lies in the fact
that responding decreased over trials, a phenomenon which
could be attributed to fatigue effects (these children had
two blocks of six locations and consequently more trials in
the entire task than 2h year olds). Thus, there was no evi-
dence that children were using a problem-solving strategy of
ruling out previously chosen locations, and it could be
assumed that chance remained at a fairly constant level over
trials.
Since there were six possible response alternatives
and six test trials in each block of locations for 6\ year
olds, chance was assumed to be .16. For 2\ year olds, there
were six alternatives and six test trials in the first block,
and four alternatives and four test trials in the second
block
^
so that chance would be .16 and .25 for the first
and second blocks, respectively. However, for the purposes
of simplifying analysis, the more conservative level of
chance (.25) was used for the data from 2-$ year olds. One-
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Table 8
Mean number of integration responses as a function of
age, block, and trials
Age '<
Trials 1-j Trials 4- 6 Trials 1-3 Trials 4- 6
Block I 1.95 1.95 2.20 2.45
Trials 1-3 Trials 4- 6 Trials 1-i Trials 4- 6
Block II 1.40 1.30 2.45 2.10
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tailed t-tests were performed on the integration responses
for both age groups for each condition and showed that
children were responding well above chance in both congruency
conditions. The t values for year olds were 11.23 (con-
gruent), d^ = j9, £^.001, and 7.11 ( noncongruent
) , d^ = ^9,
£^.001. For V-,, year olds, these values were 16.75 (congruent),
df = j9, 2.<«001, and 14. 1j (noncongruent), df_ = :59, 2.<.001.
Thus, the major prediction of this experiment was strongly
supported — children did display the ability to integrate
informa tion.
The second hypothesis was that there would be an inter-
action between age and congruency condition in that 2\ year
olds would be more lilcely to integrate congruent than noncon-
gruent relations, while 3^? year olds would do equally well
in both conditions. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of
integrative responses did fit this pattern. A two-tailed
planned comparison on the difference between congruent and
noncongruent means for i^j year olds showed that they did not
differ,
_t = 0.358, df = 38. A one-tailed planned comparison
between these same means for 7S year olds was only marginally
significant, however,
_t = 1.53, df_ = 38, £<.10. Thus, the
predicted differential effect of congruency on the two age
groups did appear, but not as strongly as hypothesized. In
fact, the effect appears only for the data for Set II, as
Table 7 indicates,
A 4-way repeated measures analysis (age x sex x set x
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FIGURE 3
Mean proportion correct responses on integration trials as atunction of age ancJ condition
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congruency) was also done on integration responses to deter-
mine whether age, set, and congruency had significant effects
on performance. The results of this analysis (Table 9)
indicated that age had a significant main effect, F (1,36) =
5.02, 2_^.05., and that its interaction with congruency was
only marginal, F (1, 36) = 3.63, £<.10. (This marginal
interaction has already been discussed in terms of planned
comparisons carried out on the hypothesized interaction
between age and congruency described on p. 5 9.) Also, there
was a significant interaction between age, set, and congruency,
F (1,36) = 7.88, p^.Ol. This interaction seemed to stem
from the fact that younger children made more integration
responses to congruent items on Set II, while older children
made more integration responses to noncongruent items in
that set (see Table 7). One reason this may have occurred is
because a particular item (or items) in the Set II congruent
condition was causing problems for the 3h year olds. Conse-
quently the number of errors made for each individual congruent
item by subjects in both age groups was examined and the
results are shown in Table 10. It seems as though two items,
in particular, were responsible for most of the errors made
by 3^ year olds — the "books-desk" relation and the "money-
table" relation. For some reason, those relations were
especially difficult for 3^^ year olds. For 21^ year olds, on
the other hand, the distribution of errors seems to fairly
equal across individual items.
Table 9
Summary of analysis of variance forintegration responses
AT
XT
AC
XC
TC
S(AX )
AXT
AXC
ATC
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Memory Loss
In this experiment, children could fail to make an
integration response for two reasons - 1) either they did
not co-ordinate the required information, or 2) they forgot
the relevant container-location relation for a particular
object-container pair. The success with which subjects
correctly located the containers on post-test trials after
missing an integration pair could give at least some indi-
cation of how important this second factor was. The propor-
tion of correct and incorrect container-location responses
following an error on the integration trials is shown in
Table 11. 2^ year olds were more likely to make a memory
error following failure to integrate than were 3h. year olds
(60% versus 36%). This difference in proportion of memory
errors following an integration error was found to be signi-
ficant using a z_-test on differences between proportions,
z = 2.22, £<.02. Thus, one reason that younger children
were responding at lower levels on integration trials could
be because they were more likely to forget the initial
locations of the containers.
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Table 11
Proportion of container-location errors followinq
object-container errors
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Discussion
The major focus of this first experiment was to deter-
mine the extent to which very young children possess a funda-
mental cognitive skill which has been implicated as having
importance in memory — namely, the ability to integrate two
pieces of verbal information in order to reach a conclusion.
The major prediction was that even ^1? year old children have
this ability since it may be an important operation involved
in the comprehension of everyday events. A related problem
studied here was whether this ability to integrate might
develop as a function of having had repeated and varied
experiences with premise-like information and its conclusions
in real-life situations. If this were the case, one could
hypothesize that younger children could integrate information,
but only when that information is congruent with their exper-
ience. For older children, on the other hand, these integra-
tive skills might be so well-practiced that they could be
applied to even arbitrary sets of information.
The main prediction in this study was overwhelmingly
confirmed. When 2^ and 3if year old children were given a
task which required the location of objects on the basis of
combining verbal information, they performed at levels which
were well above chance. In fact, ^5% of the subjects made no
errors at all in a particular set. Clearly, these high
levels of responding indicate that young children do have in
their repertoire some mechanism for integrating information.
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The idea that the cognitive structure involved in
integration becomes content-free with development, in the
sense that its application is less reliant on the situation
being congruent with experience, was the second issue explored
by this experiment. The prediction was that 2h year old
children would be more likely to integrate information that
was within the realm of their experience. Older children,
however, would perform equally well in congruent and non-
congruent situations, since their ability would be less con-
tent-dependent. The findings of the present study do not
provide strong support for this hypothesis, although there
was a trend in the postulated direction. Younger children
did make more integration responses to congruent than non-
congruent items, although this difference was only marginally
significant and approved in only one item set.
Several possibilities exist in terms of explaining this
finding. One is that the hypothesis concerning how integra-
tive skills develop is erroneous — that the operation of
integrating information is entirely independent of experiences
the child may have had. Another is that the wrong age groups
were isolated to demonstrate the possible interaction between
congruency factors and the development of integration. . It
could be that 2\ year olds have already had a vast amount of
practice using integrative skills, so that already, their
structures have become "content-free". Still another possi-
bility is that items in the noncongruent condition were not
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so noncongruent after all. m the construction of the non-
congruent relations, all items that remained out of the total
set of stimuli after congruent items had been selected were
randomly paired. Thus, some noncongruent items were quite
obviously not relations the child could have experienced,
e.g., ladder-desk-greenhouse. Others, hov;ever, could have
made sense to the child, e.g., letter-shelf-gas station.
Although this last relationship is probably not as salient as
"baby-crib-house", for example, it is certainly a relation-
ship which is possible, if not probable. The fact that
noncongruent items may not have been so different from con-
gruent items overall is substantiated by the finding that in
acquisition, there was no difference in learning congruent
versus noncongruent relations. Alternatively, one could talk
about the fact that congruent items were not as congruent as
initially supposed. In either case, however, it may be that
poor choice of items for congruent and noncongruent conditions
was responsible for the relative weakness of the findings,
rather than the formulation of an erroneous hypothesis.
The last aspect of the data which was considered dealt
with why failures to integrate occurred. On those integration
trials where subjects made errors, a post-test was given to
deteraine if loss of memory for initial container-location
relationships was contributing to those errors. An inspection
of the data showed that 48% of the subjects made errors on
container-location relationships on these trials, implying
that memory and not any lack of integration ability was
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accounting for integration errors. Moreover, younger children
were more likely than older children to make memory errors,
a factor which is probably accounting for their lower levels
of integration responses. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) have
already established the importance of memory factors in
inference-making. Memory seems to be an important component
of integration performance in the presei.'t task, as well.
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Experiment II
The second experiment was designed to explore the
consequences of the child's ability to integrate information
on his memory for that information. The importance of the
activity of the child in determining what will be remembered,
especially for "involuntary rememberers" has already been
discussed. If integration can be termed an "activity", then
it should play a role in the memory functioning of this young
age group. A depth of processing model would predict a similar
result, since integration involves an operation on information
which goes beyond the passive recording of static, separate
units. If the child's cognitive skills match the task demands,
the likelihood that a deeper level of processing ensues is
increased, thereby facilitating memory. Experiment I has
already demonstrated that integration is a cognitive skill
that very young children do possess. Since their cognitive
skills match the task demands, their memory should be affected.
In order to test this hypothesis. Experiment II was carried
out, using a "finding game" similar to that of Experiment I.
Here, though, on some trials a delay was introduced before
the child was permitted to search for designated objects.
Also, there were two types of presentation conditions, one
where the child had to integrate information to find objects,
and one where he was given the location of the object
directly. If integration affects memory, children should
be more likely to find objects after a delay in the first
condition than in the second.
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Method
Subjects
Twenty-four children who were 2\ years of age and 24
who were 6h years of age participated in this study. There
were equal numbers of boys and girls in each age group.
Once again, children were recruited from a sample of middle
class families in Springfield, Massachusetts, many of whom
had already participated in other projects on early cognitive
development at the University of Massachusetts Child Study
Center. None of these subjects, however, had participated
in Experiment I,
Six 2% year old children, i boys and i girls, were
replaced, either because they did not show any interest in
the task initially or because they did not complete the
entire task. Furthermore, seven other children in the initial
sample of 48 were not included in data analysis because they
failed to reach acquisition on all acquisition trials. These
subjects included one year old girl, 4 2\ year old boys,
and 2 2i^ year old girls. Thus, the final sample consisted of
23 3^-5 year old children ranging in age from 3 years, 5 months
to 3 years, 7 months (X = 3 years, 5 months) and 18 2^ year
old children, ranging in age from 2 years, 5 months to 2
years, 6 months (X = 2 years, 5 months).
Apparatus and Stimuli
The stimuli used were identical to those used in Experi-
ment I. However, in the present study, buildings, containers,
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and objects were presented in three sets of four instead of
two sets of six.
Design
As in Experiment I, the task was divided into two
phases — acquisition and test trials. Once again, acquisi-
tion involved the subject learning the locations of con-
tainers, with the difference that only four locations were
used for a particular block of trials. Each subject received
three blocks of four locations in the entire task.
Test trials differed slightly from those in the first
experiment. Since the purpose of this study was to see if
there would be differences in memory for integrated informa-
tion as opposed to direct information, test trials were of
four types. On half of the four test trials in each block,
subjects were instructed to find objects on the basis of
co-ordinating information. Thus, as in the first experiment,
if children had learned that a mailbox was in the store, the
test trial would consist of the following: "The key is in
the mailbox. Find the key." On remaining trials, information
about the location of the object was presented directly. Using
the above example, a sample trial would be, "The key is in
the store. Find the key." Within each of these conditions,
half the responses were delayed and half were tested immediately.
Therefore, there were four different types of test trials in
each block — delayed integration (DI), delayed direct (DD),
immediate integration (II), and immediate direct (ID). The
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purpose of including these last two types of trials was to
obtain some baseline measures for performance independent
of the delay interval.
Because congruency of object-container-location rela-
tions was not a significant factor in Experiment I, all
relations used in the present experiment were noncongruent
.
Container-location, object-container, and object-location
relations were randomly selected from the entire set of
stimuli, with the restrictions that the congruent relations
in Experiment I not be used and that each item appear once
in the entire task. Particular sets of relations were randomly
assigned to each of the three blocks of trials for each subject.
Also, the order of presentation of acquisition and test trials
within a block was random for each subject. The design of
this experiment was therefore a Z (age) x 2 (sex) x 4 (trial
type) model where trial type was a within subjects variable.
Procedure
The procedure essentially followed the same format as
the previous experiment with some minor modifications.
In order to insure that children knew the names of
locations, preliminary training trials on the names of loca-
tions were conducted. The experimenter first named each
building in the array for the child, and then asked him to
point to each building as it was named. This was done until
the child had correctly identified each building twice in
succession.
74
Acquisition trials followed the same presentation method
described in Experiment I.
Test trials consisted of the ID, li, dd, and DI trial
types described above. On DD and DI trials, the child was
given one portion of the verbal instruction once (e.g., "The
key is in the
) and was then distracted for 30 seconds
with the bead stringing toy. At the end of the delay period,
he was instructed to find the object (e.g., "Find the key").
As in the first experiment, if a subject approached and
touched an incorrect location, he was prevented from lifting
it. Following a set of test trials, he was given a post-
test to assess memory loss for initial information. If an
error was made on a DI trial, for example, the child was
asked to locate the container for the missed item. If the
trial was a DD trial, he was asked to identify the building
for the missed item.
Results
Acquisition Trials
The mean number of trials to reach criterion in the
acquisition of container-location relations for each block
is shown in Table 12, In general, older children reached
criterion faster than younger children (X = 14.7^ and 16.35,
for older and younger children, respectively). Completely
errorless responding required Iz trials for each block (three
trials for each of the four locations). Thus, it is clear
that both groups of children were again learning the initial
relationships quite rapidly. The mean number of trials to
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reach criterion for blocks 1, 2, and 3 were 15.95, 15.32, and
15.05, respectively. Thus, the amount of time it took sub-
jects to learn the locations of containers remained fairly
constant over blocks of trials. Table 13 illustrates the
results of the
. (age) x 2 (sex) x 3 (block) repeated measures
analysis of variance which was performed on these data. Age
was a significant main effect, F (1,37) = 14.87, £<..001.
Younger children did require more trials to reach criterion
than older children. The only other significant effect was
an age x sex x block interaction, F (^, 74) = 3.8^, .03,
which appeared to be the result of year old boys requiring
more learning trials in blocks 1 and 2 and 2^ year old girls
requiring more learning trials in block 6 (see Table 12).
Test Trials
Since all subjects received an equal number of test
trials, the dependent measure used in analyzing performance
was the number of correct responses in each of the trial-
type conditions. These were summed over the three blocks of
trials for each subject, so that for each trial type, the
minimum score was 0 and the maximum score was 3. Figure 4
illustrates the result. Over all trials, 3% year olds were
responding at higher levels than 2^^ year olds. Also, per-
formance in both delay conditions was lower than in immediate
conditions, a finding, which, of course, would be expected
if decay from memory were operating here. The most relevant
aspect of the data is the difference between the direct
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Table 13
Summary of analysis of variance for number of
trials to criterion
Source of variance df MS F
Age (A) 1 84. 20 14
Sex (X) 1 11. 90 2. 10
AX 1 0. 12 0 02
S(AX) 37 5
.
66
Block (B) 2 10. 54 2. 28
AB 2 2. 24 0. 48
XB 2 8. 71 1. 89
AXB Z 17. 63 3. 82 »
SB(AX) 74 4. 62
**£ .001.
*£ -03.
7R
FIGURE 4
Mean number of correct responses on test trials as a
function of age and trial type
0.0-1
, ^
,
ID II DD Dl
TRIAL TYPE
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and integration trials. Figure 4 indicates that performance
for integration trials is at almost the same level as per-
formance for the direct trials in both the immediate and delay
situations.
A closer inspection of the means, shown in Table 14,
confirms these initial impressions. Older children made an
average of 2.27 correct responses over all trial-types,
while younger children made 1.69 correct responses. Further-
more, the mean number of correct responses for the ID and II
conditions was 2.59 and 2.37, respectively, while the means
for the DD and DI trials were 1.68 and 1.44. There did not
appear to be any major difference between integration and
direct trials in either immediate or delayed conditions.
Before analyzing these results in more detail, it was
necessary to determine if responding exceeded chance levels
for the different test trial conditions. On any given trial
within a block, there were four possible response alternatives.
Since children received only three trials in each condition,
and it could be assumed that they would be correct by chance
on one-fourth of these trials, chance performance was considered
to be .175. Two-tailed
_t-tests on the means for each condition
for each age group showed that performance was reliably above
chance for all conditions for each age group. The values of
t_ for the ID, II, DD, and DI conditions for 3h year olds were
29.52, 19.83, 6.58, and 5.70, d^ = 22, £<.001. The corres-
ponding values for 2^-? year olds were 8.53 (df = 17, £^.001),
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Table 14
Mean number of correct responses on test trials
as a function of age and trial-type
Age (N=18) (N=23) Over ages (N=41)
Trial type
ID 2.22 2.87 2.59
II 1.94 2.70 2.37
DD 1.38 1.91 1.68
DI 1.22 1.61 1.44
Over trial
types 1.69 2.27 ^.02
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5.08 (df = 17, £<.001), 0.19 (df = 17, £<.00^), and 3.65
(df = 17, £<.005).
A 3-way repeated measures analysis of variance (age x
sex X trial type) of the mean number of correct responses
confirmed that age was a significant factor, F (1, ^7 ) =
24.79, £<.001 (see Table 15). Trial type was also signifi-
cant, F (3,111) = 22.43, £<.001. Newman-Keuls comparisons
among the means for trial type indicated that all means were
significantly different from each other except for the ID
versus II and DD versus DI comparisons. The values that these
contrasts took are as follows: ID versus DI, £ = 1.146,
£<.01; ID versus DD, £ = .902, £<.01; II versis DI, ^ =
.927, 2_<..01; II versus DD, ^ = .683, £^.01. These analyses
verify the notion that performance did not differ between
direct and integration trials.
Memory Post-Test
Table 16 summarizes the propostion correct and incorrect
responses on the post-test following an error on test trials.
For direct conditions, these figures represent the extent to
which the names of locations are remembered. For integration
trials, they represent the extent to which the container-
location relations are remembered for missed items. These
data, to some degree, provide some insights into why errors
occur for the different types of trials. As can be seen, for
direct trials, very few errors were made because children
forgot the names of locations; rather some attentional factor
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Table 15
Summary of analysis of variance for correct
responses on test trials
Source of variance df MS F
Age (A) 1 13.10 ^4.79 *
Sex (X) 1 0.10 0.18
AX 1 0.10 0.20
S(AX ) 37 0.53
Trial-type (T) 3 11.57 22.43
AT 3 0.25 0.48
XT 0.3^ 0.62
AXT 3 0.1^ 0.23
ST(AX
)
111 0.52
*P .001.
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may have been involved, at least in ID trials. For inte-
gration trials, a fair number of errors for container-location
relations followed an error for locating the object, indi-
cating once more that memory for initial relations plays a
role in the process of integration.
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Discussion
The major hypothesis of Experiment II was that integra-
ting information would facilitate memory for that information.
This prediction was derived from a number of theoretical
perspectives which stress the importance of the activity of
the child, especially the very young child, in influencing
his memory. Integration is one activity which the very young
child can and does perform. Therefore, in situations where
he applies this operation, his memory for that information
should be enhanced. The task in this experiment was designed
so that on some trials, the child would be required to inte-
grate information in order to find objects, while on other
trials he had to register static cues as to their location.
If integration affects memory function, the child should
remember better the locations of objects which he had to
deduce than those which involved a more passive or episodic
registration of information.
The findings show that performance on DI trials did not
exceed performance on DD trials for either age group. Thus,
the prediction failed to be supported. However, performance
in these two conditions did not differ, which suggests that
integration might still be having some effects on memory.
For one thing, more information had to be encoded and stored
in the UI condition — object-container-location relations
comprised three bits of information the child had to process.
In DD trials, only two bits of information were involved —
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the object-location relation. If the functioning of memory
is governed by static encoding and retrieval of stimuli,
it would be expected that performance on test trials would
^^^^^^^^ the DI condition, since there was a greater like-
lihood that one of the bits would be lost somewhere in
processing. The fact that performance did not differ
between DD and DI trials suggests that some factor was
responsible for maintaining memory on integration trials.
Possibly, that factor is the activity of integration.
The other consideration in interpreting these findings
is that although II trials were intended to provide some
indication that integration was occurring even on DI trials,
they did not guarantee that it did. There was some evidence
that children were integrating on DI trials. Many children,
when they heard the object-location relation, looked imme-
diately to the correct location before they were distracted,
indicating that integration was occurring at this point.
Nevertheless, DI trials may have included cases where integra-
tion did not occur upon presentation of the verbal information.
Thus, there are an unknown number of instances in the DI
condition in which integration may not have occurred prior
to the delay interval. The consequence could only be a
deflation in the true value of the scores for DI trials.
Unfortunately, given the design of this experiment, there is
no systematic way to assess that portion of trials in which
failure to integrate may have occurred. One way around this
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problem might be to repeat this experiment with the modifica-
tion that children be required to locate objects before the
delay without actually seeing them. Such a procedure would
provide stronger evidence that DI trials did actually involve
integrative processing on the part of the child, and the
hypothesized superiority of performance in DI over DD trials
might appear.
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Conclusion
The most significant finding in the studies presented
here was that very young children had the ability to co-
ordinate two pieces of verbal information with which they
were presented in order to derive a conclusion. The presence
of this integrative ability was demonstrated quite clearly
in both Experiments I and II, where levels of correct respond-
ing on integration trials were exceptionally high, even for
year olds. Such a finding does run contrary to some of
the experimental literature which was described in preceding
sections. Specifically, these results directly conflict
with the Kendler (1963) position that "inference...
may be a process that is not readily available to lower
phylogenetic species and perhaps not to young children."
(p. 46). Both the Kendlers' task and the present one required
the integration of two components of information in order
that the problem be solved. Yet, while the problem was
fairly easily solved by year olds in the present task,
even 5 year olds could not solve the problem in the Kendler
experiment. Several factors could be responsible for the
divergent results. First, the stimuli used in the present
experiment were colorful, interesting toys which were both
familiar and attractive to children. The Kendlers, on the
other hand used a large unfamiliar apparatus whose only
function was to dispense marbles and ball-bearings. It could
be, then, that more interesting nature of the stimuli used
in the present experiment enhanced children's attention to
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and motivation to perform in the task. Secondly, if one
analyses what was required of the child in these two experi-
mental situations, there are some important differences.
The Kendlers' inference task required the child to: 1)
realize that a particular strategy was necessary to solve
the problem, z) remember two previously learned response
components (push panel to get marble, drop marble in slot
to get toy), and 3) integrate these two responses to solve
the problem. Deficiencies in solving the problem could thus
be a function of: 1) a production deficiency in terms of
calling forth the appropriate strategy (as was previously
discussed), 2) a failure to remember both response components
or 3) an absence of the ability to integrate the response
components. In the present task, a correct solution of the
problem required the child to: 1) realize that a particular
strategy was required to solve the problem, ^) remember one
response component (the container-location relation), and j)
integrate that response component with current information
to solve the problem. The differences in these two tasks
thus lie in two areas. In the first place, the present task
required the child to remember only one response component
as opposed to two. The importance of memory for initial
relationships in determining whether or not integration takes
place has been demonstrated in both this study (where it was
found that if children did not integrate, very often it was
because initial relations had been forgotten) and by Bryant
90
and Trabasso (1971). Thus, failure to respond in the
Kendlers- task could have been due to loss of memory for
the original response components. This explanation, however,
is not very satisfying in light of the fact that the response
components were fairly well-learned in that task. The other
possibility is that in the present task, the appropriate
strategy to use was more obvious to subjects, since on a
given trial, the verbal instruction provided some cues as to
the appropriate steps to take. For example, a statement such
as "The key is in the car" requires a progression from key
to car to gas station. The initial step in that progression
has already been provided in the present task, and as such
may have alerted the child to the fact that it was necessary
to link information about the object and container with infor-
mation about the location of that container. In the Kendlers'
task, the instruction was to "get a toy", a statement which
provides the child only with the end point of the progression
"press panel to get marble", "marble in slot to get toy". In
this case, the child would have to work backwards through
the progression in order to ascertain the starting point for
solving the problem. His inability to find a starting point
might thus be the production deficiency involved. Therefore,
the differences in results between these two studies may lie
in the fact that in the present study, the particular strategy
necessary for correct solution was more apparent to the child
by virtue of the fact that the starting point for problem
Lem
91
solution was provided. Making the requirements of a probl.
clearer to the child to induce more solutions of the probl«
has been found to be significant in one other recently done
study. Kopp, O'Connor, and Finger (1975) found that children
were more likely to use a long stick to get a cookie out of
a tube when that tube was transparent than when it was opaque.
Presumably, this was because the demands of the problem were
clearer when the child could see the relationships among the
three items involved. The structure of the present task
probably provides the child with these same kinds of cues.
Still another factor might be responsible for these
discripant findings. The Kendlers' task could be characterized
as essentially an episodic one, that is, the material and
apparatus used were not especially meaningful to the child.
On the other hand, the materials used in the present experi-
ments were meaningful to the child in the sense that the
objects and verbal materials used were familiar and the
relationships among them were at least some of the time
plausible ones. Besides facilitating attention to the task,
this aspect of the present study essentially made the nature
of the task a semantic one. Young children's difficulties
with episodic tasks have already been discussed. Their,
performance is quite good, however, when they perceive a
situation as meaningful, which involves a semantic operation.
Thus, it could be that because this task may have tapped
children's semantic processes, they performed quite well.
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Furthermore, they might perform equally well in a task such
as the Kendlers' if that problem were cast in a more meaning-
ful context for children.
The finding that young children did integrate verbal
information when the cues to perform that operation were
clear does fit in with some of the other experimental findings
presented earlier. if finding objects following their
invisible displacement (Stage VI of sensorimotor development)
can be conceptualized as an integrative operation, and that
operation is within the grasp of pre-verbal children, then
it is not too surprising that an analogous operation on
verbal materials is within the grasp of children who are
starting to deal with the world in more verbal terms.
Some added insights into the process of integration are
provided by portions of the data in Experiment II. In
particular, the finding that performance on ID and II trials
or on DD and DI trials did not differ significantly implies
that integrating information is almost as easy for the child
as processing direct cues. This notion is strengthened by
the general impression that during experimental sessions,
children found objects on integration trials very quickly and
without hesitation. As soon as the information was presented,
children began their approach toward a location. In fact on
DI trials, the experimenter had difficulty in preventing
several children from searching immediately for designated
objects because their reaction was so fast. The integration
process seems to be a fairly rapid on^ and most importantly,
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a fairly spontaneous one for very young children. Surprisingly,
however, this ability has received little attention from
developmental psychologists, despite its naturalness to young
children.
Although younger children tend to do somewhat less well
than older children on integrative trials, there is every
reason to believe that at this point, such age differences
are largely a function of lack of memory for the components
of the task. In both Experiments I and II, the data on
memory for initial container-location relations following
a failure to integrate indicated that this was the case.
Thus, developmental changes in integration performance may
reflect changes in memory capacity, for example, rather than
changes in the skill per se.
Throughout this paper, a very heavily "cognitive"
orientation has been taken in discussions of integration
abilities in children. Integration has been described as an
activity that requires co-ordination of information. That
activity derives from cognitive structures which direct its
operations . This dynamic, organismic perspective merely
reflects a bias on the part of the author in interpreting
the process which enables the child to successfully deirive
conclusions in the integration task. However, this is by no
means the only perspective from which these data could be
interpreted. The major purpose of this paper was to demon-
strate that very young children have a particular ability and
not to establish the precise character of the process from
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which this ability derives. However, an alternative position
does exist to account for successful performance in this
task, and should be mentioned briefly at this point.
The alternative point of view in describing performance
in the present task is the traditional associationistic or
S-R approach. If one analyzes the present problem for the
child as one where he first learns a B-C relationship (con-
tainer-location), and then is presented with an A-B relation-
ship (object-container), the A-C response can be seen as a
chaining event, where B acts as the link in the chain. The
contiguity between stimulus and response components acts to
strengthen their relationship and establishes a bond between
them. If the B-C pair has a strong bond, B acquires secondary
reinforcing value, which in turn strengthens the A-B bond.
Therefore, an occurrence of A will elicit B, which will in
turn elicit C because of the strong relationships among all
the components (Skinner, 1938).
Alternatively, one could take Hull's (1952) perspective
of how "habit segments" become connected. During acquisition
of the B-C pair, subjects acquire, in addition, an anticipa-
tory goal response, r^ , to C. The r^ operates backward until
the stimulus which begins the habit segment also elicits it.
Thus, r may also become tied to A-B such that A-tr B-w: C
.
' g ^ g g
Empirical data from the literature on paired associates
learning in children does support both of these theoretical
positions. For example, both of these theories predict that
learning of B-C pairs in the paired associate task, followed
by learning A-B pairs should facilitate the learning of A-C
pairs. This does occur, according to a number of studies
(Daehler and Wright, 1968; Flamer, 1965; Nikkei and Palermo,
1965; Odom, 1965). These theories could therefore also describe
the process which occurs in the integration of object-con-
tainer-location relations in the present study. Container-
location bonds might generate either anticipatory goal re-
sponses, or containers could acquire secondary reinforcing
value to facilitate the object-location connections. How-
ever, S-R theorists would have some trouble in explaining
why children (and 3% year olds, in particular) apparently
integrated congruent and noncongruent items at approximately
equal levels. Associationistic theories would predict that
congruent items would be integrated more than noncongruent
items for all ages, since the initial bonds among the items
are presumably stronger in the first place. In particular,
strong associations should affect the A-B relation, which is
presented only once in this task for each item. In congruent
conditions, the A-C relation should be attained faster because
of the initial strength of A-B. Of course, since there may
be some problems in this study in terms of the specific items
used for noncongruent relations, this particular experiment
is not a good test of the relative value of associationistic
versus cognitive theories. However, the differential pre-
dictions of these theories in a task such as this one are
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important to consider. Furthermore, the terms "secondary
reinforcer" and "anticipatory goal response" are descriptive
and have little explanatory value in delineating the specific
nature of what happens inside the child's head when he
integrates. An "anticipatory goal response" in the S-R
framework, could, in fact, be likened to "cognitive activity"
in the organismic perspective. Both are necessary theoretical
constructs which supply the missing link between A and C,
and both are vague in terms of explaining precisely why and
how the linkage occurs.
Regardless of what theoretical perspective one takes,
however, in describing the process of integration, the fact
remains that it is a skill which very young children possess.
How it develops and how it might affect memory for information
which has been integrated is still unclear. Nevertheless,
integration appears to be so prevalent and so spontaneous in
even very young children that it deserves even further
attention.
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